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Examination of Divergent Lower Court
Standards and a Proposed Framework For
Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
states from interfering with the exercise of fundamental constitu-
tional rights-substantive and procedural-absent a showing that
the interference is the least restrictive means available for the ef-
fectuation of a compelling state interest." Additionally, the "uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine"' dictates that, absent a compelling
justification, a state violates substantive due process when it indi-
rectly burdens the exercise of fundamental rights by conditioning
the receipt of governmental benefits upon an individual's waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine further provides that, absent a compelling justification, a
state cannot withhold or cancel a state-created benefit as a penalty
for the assertion of fundamental rights.8 As states have become in-
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
2. See generally French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234
(1961); Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); O'Neil, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443
(1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HRv. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Comment, An-
other Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968). For a discussion
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as it applies to the rights of a criminal appellant,
see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Ap-
pellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). For discussions of the constitutionality of plea bargaining
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, compare Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Plea Bargaining, 83 HAv. L. Rxv. 1387 (1970) (plea bargaining is unconstitutional under
the constitutional conditions doctrine) with McCoy & Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Pro-
cess in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. Rzv. 887 (1980) (plea bargaining is reconcilable with
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a constitutionally adequate substitute for trial).
3. Recent cases have focused on the penalty aspect of the doctrine. See, e.g., Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (penalty on the fundamental right of political association); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (penalty on the fundamental right to travel); Shapiro v.
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creasingly involved in the distribution of benefits in the form of
jobs, housing, and welfare, courts have invoked the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine regularly to strike down state schemes
that condition the availability of various benefits on the individ-
ual's waiver or nonassertion of fundamental rights.'
Social program funding represents a classic area in which
courts have used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invali-
date state plans conditioning receipt of a benefit upon an individ-
ual's waiver of a fundamental right. For example, in Sherbert v.
Verner5 the Supreme Court used the doctrine to invalidate a South
Carolina unemployment compensation plan that conditioned the
grant of unemployment benefits upon an applicant's availability
for work.' The state denied unemployment benefits to the Sabba-
tarian plaintiff in Sherbert because she refused, for religious rea-
sons, to work on Saturdays.7 In effect, the South Carolina plan
conditioned receipt of its unemployment benefits on plaintiff's
waiver of her fundamental right to assert her religious beliefs. The
Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and held
that the unemployment benefits plan placed an unconstitutional
penalty on plaintiff's right to freedom of religion.8
State-created benefits are sometimes less direct than the dis-
tribution of public monies. For example, judges and prosecutors
can grant criminal defendants leniency in criminal charging, sen-
tencing, and bail setting decisions. In several recent decisions, the
Supreme Court has employed the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine to prohibit the withdrawal of leniency when it effectively pe-
nalizes criminal defendants for exercising their fundamental
rights.10 In North Carolina v. Pearce"" a criminal defendant ob-
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (penalty on the fundamental right to interstate travel);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (penalty on the fundamental right to jury
trial); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (penalty on the free exercise of religion).
4. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 144.
5. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6. Id. at 400. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act provided that, to
be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be "able to work... and available for work." Fur-
ther, the Act provided that a claimant was ineligible for benefits "[i]f ... he ... failed,
without good cause... to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employ-
ment office. . . ." Id. When appellant refused to work on Saturdays, the state deemed her
unavailable for work and terminated her benefits.
7. Id. at 401.
8. Id. at 406.
9. Whenever a state official exercises his discretion to seek less than the maximum
criminal sanction allowed by statute for a particular crime, he, in effect, grants a positive
benefit of leniency to the individual defendant. See Comment, supra note 2, at 174.
10. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
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tained reversal of his original conviction, but upon retrial and re-
conviction the trial judge imposed a harsher sentence than had
been imposed after the first conviction. The Supreme Court held
that the imposition of this harsher sentence violated defendant's
substantive due process rights because it penalized him for suc-
cessfully asserting his fifth amendment right to be free from self-
incrimination.12 The Pearce Court coined the term "vindictive-
ness" to characterize the judge's retaliatory action of penalizing de-
fendant's exercise of a fundamental right with a harsher sen-
tence.13 Thus, whether a state penalizes an individual's exercise of
a fundamental right by cancelling welfare benefits or by withhold-
ing lenient criminal sanction benefits, the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine applies.
Since Pearce and its progeny,14 lower federal courts have de-
veloped conflicting standards for determining whether prosecutors
violate substantive due process by imposing penalties upon defen-
dants who exercise either statutory or constitutional rights. Re-
cently, the Sixth Circuit adopted an overall balancing test: due
process is violated when a reasonable person would think there ex-
ists a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, unless the state can re-
but this likelihood with objective, on-the-record explanations of
the prosecutor's conduct.15 Other circuits have employed standards
that focus on "actual vindictiveness"16 or "appearance of vindic-
tiveness"' 7 to assess the due process implications of prosecutorial
actions that follow a defendant's exercise of rights.
The purposes of this Recent Development are to trace the Su-
preme Court's development of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
711 (1969). Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (affirming the unconstitutional
conditions principle, but finding it inapplicable to prosecutorial penalties in connection with
the give-and-take of plea bargaining).
11. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
12. Id. at 725.
13. Id.
14. The Supreme Court extended the Pearce rule to place due process constraints
upon the conduct of prosecutors in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
15. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Jones, 587 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); Hard-
wick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980); Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1979);
United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Koski v. Samaha, 491 F. Supp. 432 (D.N.H. 1980).
19811
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trine in the "vindictiveness" cases to analyze the divergent tests
currently applied in prosecutorial vindictiveness cases, and to pro-
pose a proper framework for analysis in this area. This Recent De-
velopment submits that absent a compelling state justification, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply when increased
prosecutorial charges effectively penalize criminal defendants for
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. 18 When statutory
or other nonfundamental rights of the accused are involved, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine should not apply;19 instead,
courts should invoke their supervisory powers over the administra-
tion of criminal justice in order to protect criminal defendants
against prosecutorial abuses.2 °
II. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
A. Origins and Policy
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine discredited the su-
perficial logic of the proposition that the state's power to withhold
absolutely certain privileges or benefits necessarily included the
power to condition the grant of benefits in any manner the state
chose.2 In support of this position, states often asserted that such
conditions did not deprive individuals of their rights since, by a
simple rejection of the proffered benefit, the right could be re-
tained.22 For a time, the courts accepted this rationale. 23 For in-
18. See text accompanying notes 150-71 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 172-88 infra.
20. The Supreme Court recently observed that the supervisory power "serves the 'two-
fold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity." United States v.
Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2446 n.8 (1980). The supervisory powers should serve as an appro-
priate mechanism for controlling prosecutorial misconduct when a defendant's nonfunda-
mental rights are involved.
21. State legislatures often urged this position. See, e.g., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting public speaking in the Boston Common).
In Davis the state successfully argued that its power to withhold access to municipal prop-
erty altogether included the lesser power to permit access with restrictions on free speech.
Id. at 48.
22. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of New York's Feinberg Law, which made membership in the Communist Party
a prima facie ground for dismissal of a public school teacher). According to the Court in
Adler,
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think, and
believe as they will .... It is equally clear that they have no right to work for the
State ... on their own terms.. . . If they do not choose to work on [the State's terms],
they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.
Id. at 492.
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stance, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford2 Justice Holmes
invoked this theory in rejecting the claim of a policeman fired for
violating a regulation that restricted political speech. Holmes con-
cluded that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to





The untenable constitutional implications of Justice Holmes'
position soon became apparent. With the twentieth century came
the state's expansion as an economic unit and its increasing in-
volvement in housing, education, and welfare. As a result, the total
number of benefits at the state's disposal increased enormously.2
This development led to the recognition that, by allowing a state
to condition the receipt of benefits on the waiver of individual
rights, there existed a potential for tremendous erosion of funda-
mental constitutional liberties. Consequently, courts rejected the
earlier view, which had given the states carte blanche power to
condition the availability of state-created benefits on the surrender
of fundamental rights; in its place, they adopted the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine."' Basically, this doctrine places two sub-
stantive due process restrictions on a state. First, a state cannot
condition the receipt of its benefits upon the forfeiture or nonas-
sertion of fundamental constitutional rights.29 Second, absent a
23. E.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally di-
vided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (upholding summary dismissal of a federal civil servant on
grounds of suspected disloyalty); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934)
(state may condition the benefit of attending a public university upon mandatory R.O.T.C.
participation, even if the nonparticipation is religiously motivated).
24. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
25. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
26. For an examination of the increasing scope and extent of government largesse, see
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
27. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Comment, supra note 2.
28. The Supreme Court first explicitly formulated the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876). The doctrine, however, did not
gain widescale judicial acceptance until the Warren Era. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (prohibiting state of New York from conditioning the availability of
public teaching jobs on nonmembership in the Communist Party); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (prohibiting the state from penaliz-
ing the fundamental right to associational freedom by conditioning the availability of public
teaching jobs on full disclosure of organizational memberships).
29. Under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine applies equally to, both federal and state governments. The
fifth amendment states in part that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V. The fourteenth amendment
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:431
compelling state interest, a state cannot withhold or cancel its ben-
efits in order to penalize the recipient for exercising his fundamen-
tal rights."0 In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
grounded in the assumption that to permit a state to condition the
receipt of benefits upon the surrender of fundamental rights deters
individuals from exercising these rights. This possibility requires
the prophylactic unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which treats
such conditions as tantamount to direct infringement of the funda-
mental right in question."
As early as 1926, in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Commission,32 Justice Sutherland emphatically stated the policy
behind the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: "If the state may
compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of
its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is
inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 3 3 Over
the past quarter century the Supreme Court has regularly invoked
this policy to hold unconstitutional state actions that effectively
penalize fundamental rights. 4 Most frequently, the Court has in-
validated conditions in connection with the following four areas of
states in part that "[n]o State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
Today almost all of the guarantees specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights are
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 541-42 (9th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1979). The only unincor-
porated provisions in the original Bill of Rights (the first eight amendments) are the grand
jury indictment requirement of the fifth amendment and the civil jury trial guarantee of the
seventh amendment. Id. at 542. For a general explanation of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, see Comment, supra note 2.
30. See note 3 supra.
31. See e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), in which the Court stated that
"[t]o deny la tax] exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect
to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine
them for this speech." Id. at 518. See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra
note 2.
32. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
33. Id. at 594. In Frost the Court invalidated a state law that imposed common carrier
liability on private trucking companies as a condition to highway access. The Court held
that the state could not condition this benefit upon plaintiff's surrendering of its fifth
amendment right to receive just compensation for private property taken for public use. Id.
at 599.
34. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (fundamental right of political association);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (fundamental right to refrain from self-in-
crimination and to a jury trial); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (free-
dom of speech and association); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (fundamental
right to refrain from self-incrimination); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (freedom of
religion); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (freedom of religion and press).
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state benefits: first, the privilege of foreign corporations to engage
in local business;35 second, the use of public property;8 third, the
receipt of public funds;37 and last, public employment. 8
In addition to these categories, the Court has applied the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine in the area of state benefits re-
lating to criminal sanctions. In United States v. Jackson"9 the
Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invali-
date a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act.40 Under that stat-
ute, the death penalty could be imposed only "if the verdict of the
jury [should] so recommend.' 1 The statute, however, provided no
procedure for imposing the death sentence when a defendant
pleaded not guilty or was tried before a judge. The Jackson Court
held that this scheme created an unconstitutional condition that
needlessly penalized defendant's fifth amendment right to plead
not guilty and sixth amendment right to demand a jury trial be-
cause it conditioned receipt of the more lenient sentence on waiver
of these rights.4 The Court declared that if the statute had "no
other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional
rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it
would be patently unconstitutional."
43
35. E.g., Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (state may not condi-
tion entry on a foreign corporation's waiver of the right to remove actions to federal court).
See generally G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION F FOREIGN CORPORArONS IN AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 178-87 (1918).
36. E.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (State cannot prohibit the use of pub-
lic streets for distribution of handbills that constitutes first amendment religious activities).
37. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state may not withhold unemploy-
ment benefits from otherwise eligible applicant for asserting her fundamental right to free-
dom of religion).
38. E.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (state may not deny employment to
an individual for asserting his first amendment rights by refusing to sign a loyalty oath).
39. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
40. The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1964) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), provided in part that interstate kidnappers "shall
be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed and if
the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or
for life, if the death penalty is not imposed."
41. Id.
42. 390 U.S. at 583.
43. Id. at 581. The Jackson Court further noted that the evil in the federal statute was
not that it necessarily coerced guilty pleas, but rather that it needlessly encouraged guilty
pleas. Id. at 583.
1981] 437
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B. From Pearce to Bordenkircher: Application of the Doctrine
to Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
Only three Supreme Court decisions bear directly on the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine in the context of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. The Supreme Court first dealt with the concept of
"vindictive" penalties in North Carolina v. Pearce." In Pearce a
criminal defendant had his original conviction set aside because of
a fifth amendment violation.4 Defendant was retried before the
same judge and received a harsher sentence upon reconviction."
The Supreme Court found a due process violation, stating that
[d]ue process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant
for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the
sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictive-
ness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to ap-
peal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the
part of the sentencing judge.
47
The scope of the Pearce holding is unclear. Some language in the
opinion suggests that the Court intended to fashion a sweeping due
process rule prohibiting the state from acting with even the ap-
pearance of vindictiveness in response to a criminal defendant's as-
sertion of any rights-statutory or constitutional.48 Nevertheless,
the Court's central purpose was to prohibit the state from penaliz-
ing those defendants who choose to exercise fundamental constitu-
tional rights.49 In effect, Pearce taught that substantive due pro-
cess prevents the state from penalizing a defendant with a harsher
sentence after his successful assertion of a fundamental fifth
amendment right.50
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
45. The original conviction was reversed on the ground that an involuntary confession
had been admitted into evidence in violation of defendant's fifth amendment right to refrain
from self-incrimination.
46. 395 U.S. at 713.
47. Id. at 725.
48. Id. The Court admonished in dicta that "even if the first conviction has been set
aside for nonconstitutional error, the imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be no less a
violation of due process of law." Id. at 724.
49. The Court stressed that "'penalizing those who choose to exercise' constitutional
rights 'would be patently unconstitutional."' Id.
50. The conclusion that Pearce is an unconstitutional conditions case is buttressed by
the Court's recognition that to allow harsher sentences upon reconviction after an original
conviction is set aside for constitutional error would serve to "chill the exercise of basic
constitutional rights." Id. See also McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 90.
438
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In Blackledge v. Perry51 the Supreme Court extended the
Pearce due process rule to limit prosecutorial discretion in bring-
ing criminal charges.52 In Blackledge, when defendant exercised his
statutory right to a trial de novo, the prosecutor increased the
charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. The Court held that the
prosecutor's actions violated defendant's substantive due process
rights.5 Stating that Pearce controlled, the Court declared that a
finding of an "actual retaliatory motivation" was unnecessary for a
due process violation under Pearce," and that "[a] person con-
victed of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a
trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by
substituting a more serious charge for the original one.
'55
In Blackledge the Court failed to address the nature of the
right asserted by defendant. Although the Court spoke of defen-
dant's "statutory right to appeal" for a de novo trial8 the circum-
stances suggest that the prosecutor penalized defendant for assert-
ing his constitutional right to a jury trial.57 Since Duncan v.
51. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
52. Id. at 27. Between the time of the Pearce and the Blackledge decisions, the Su-
preme Court declined to apply the Pearce rule in two decisions. In Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 (1972), defendant appealed from a misdemeanor conviction and received a trial de
novo before a different judge. The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a stiffer sen-
tence by the second judge because the possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce,
was not present in the Kentucky two-tier system. Id. at 116. The Court reaffirmed the
Pearce prophylactic rule against penalties vindictively imposed on the exercise of funda-
mental rights, but distinguished Pearce factually, since in Colten a different judge presided
over the second trial, and there was no record of the earlier proceedings. Id. at 116-17. In
Chaflin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court considered a situation in which the
petitioner received a harsher sentence upon reconviction by a different jury. While reaffirm-
ing the underlying Pearce rationale that vindictive penalties against an accused for having
successfully overturned his conviction have no place in the resentencing process, the Court
held that due process did not require extending the Pearce restrictions to jury sentencing.
Id. at 18.
53. 417 U.S. at 28-29.
54. Id. at 28.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29.
57. It is a misnomer to characterize an application for a trial de novo as an "appeal"
because the right to a de novo trial is unconditional and exists without regard to error in the
original proceeding. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction in discussing two-
tiered criminal trial systems generally. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1972).
Moreover, under North Carolina's two-tiered criminal trial system, the lower courts pro-
vided no jury trials, even in instances in which the authorized punishment would entitle the
accused to a jury trial under the sixth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). Therefore, the defendant's appeal for a trial de novo with its available jury option
may be characterized more accurately as an assertion of a fundamental right to a constitu-
tionally adequate jury trial. Commentators have argued that in Blackledge defendant's de-
mand for a trial de novo was nothing more than a demand for a constitutionally adequate
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Louisiana s and Baldwin v. New York,59 criminal defendants in
state courts possess a fundamental right to a jury trial in all cases
in which the potential prison sentence exceeds six months. By con-
trast, under North Carolina's two-tiered criminal system, applica-
ble in Blackledge, the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over misdemeanors and never provide jury trials, even though mis-
demeanor violations carry a potential two-year term of incarcera-
tion.60 Taken alone, North Carolina's district court procedure de-
prives accused misdemeanants of the fundamental right to a jury
trial as defined by the Duncan v. Louisiana mandate. Under the
system, however, a convicted misdemeanant has an absolute statu-
tory right to seek a trial de novo in superior court, in which jury
trials are available.6 1 In short, the Blackledge defendant's assertion
of his "statutory" right to a trial de novo was, in effect, an asser-
tion of his fundamental sixth amendment right to a constitution-
ally adequate jury trial. Hence, like the Pearce decision,
Blackledge may be read as an unconstitutional conditions case
holding that due process prohibits a prosecutor-absent a compel-
ling justification-from penalizing a criminal defendant with a har-
sher charge for the assertion of a fundamental constitutional right.
While reaffirming the Pearce-Blackledge unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine, the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes
62
declined to apply the rationale of those cases to prosecutorial plea
bargaining. In Bordenkircher defendant initially was indicted for a
felony punishable by a ten-year maximum sentence.63 During plea
negotiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a lenient five-
year sentence in return for defendant's guilty plea, but threatened
to reindict on habitual criminal charges carrying a mandatory life
sentence if defendant refused to forgo his fifth amendment right to
trial, since the proceeding in the lower court was procedurally deficient. See generally Mc-
Coy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 907-08.
58. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (defendant charged with a crime punishable by a two year
prison sentence has a fundamental sixth amendment right to a jury trial).
59. 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (defendant charged with a crime punishable by a six month
prison sentence has a fundamental sixth amendment right to a jury trial). See generally C.
WHTEBRvA, CRimrNAL NtocmnR 430-71 (1980).
60. In North Carolina, the maximum penalty for a misdemeanor is two years impris-
onment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(c) (1969). The district courts in North Carolina have ex-
clusive jurisdiction to try misdemeanors. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 7A-272 (1969). Finally, these
district courts provide no jury trials. N.C. GzN. STAT. § 7A-196(b) (1969).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (1969).
62. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
63. Id. at 358.
[Vol. 34:431
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plead not guilty and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial."
Despite the apparent violation of due process under the Pearce-
Blackledge rationale, the Bordenkircher Court refused to find an
unconstitutional condition. Instead, the Court held that the prose-
cutor complied with due process even though he reindicted defen-
dant on the more serious recidivist charge solely because defendant
refused to plead guilty to the original charge. 5 The Court even
conceded "as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the
prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the de-
fendant to forego his right to plead not guilty."66 The Court in
Bordenkircher distinguished Pearce and Blackledge as cases that
dealt with the state's "unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a
defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his
original conviction - a situation 'very different from the give-and-
take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecu-
tion and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargain-
ing power.' ,,67
Theoretically, the prosecutor's reindictment of the defendant
in Bordenkircher on more serious charges in retaliation for defen-
dant's assertion of fundamental rights is indistinguishable from the
penalty theory of Pearce in terms of coercive impact and deterrent
effect on the assertion of fundamental rights. Nevertheless,
Bordenkircher is reconcilable with the Court's long-standing com-
mitment to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine when the de-
cision is viewed as implicitly holding that the state demonstrated a
sufficiently compelling justification for the prosecutor's actions.
Specifically, Justice Stewart's majority opinion appears to accept
the proposition that plea bargaining is an essential element of this
country's criminal justice system. 8 On other occasions, the Court
64. Id.
65. Id. at 365.
66. Id. at 364. Contra, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (if state
action "has no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional."),
67. 434 U.S. at 362. Commentators have criticized the Bordenkircher decision on the
ground that it conflicts with the unconstitutional conditions principles enunciated in Pearce
and Blackledge. See, e.g., Rubin, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction? A
Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 165
(1979); Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness and Plea Bargaining: What are the Lim-
its?-Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 27 De PAuL L. REv. 1241 (1978). But see McCoy & Mirra,
supra note 2.
68. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Bordenkircher urged that "the guilty plea
and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal
justice systpm." 434 U.S. at 361-62. Justice Stewart further reasoned that, while a
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also has emphasized that plea bargaining is an "essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice," 69 relying on one telling sta-
tistic-that guilty pleas dispose of over ninety percent of all crimi-
nal cases, the bulk of which are the product of plea negotiations.7
0
Concededly, the Bordenkircher Court engaged in no careful analy-
sis to determine whether plea bargaining is the least restrictive
means of preserving the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, to
view the Bordenkircher Court as implicitly finding a compelling
interest accounts for the emphasis on the essentiality of plea bar-
gaining in our criminal justice system and, at the same time, recon-
ciles the decision with Pearce and Blackledge. In sum, the Pearce-
Blackledge unconstitutional conditions doctrine remains viable af-
ter Bordenkircher outside the plea bargaining context.
III. LOWER FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL
VnIcNDC rss
Lower federal courts have applied the Pearce-Blackledge ra-
tionale to a wide variety of situations evidencing prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness, 7 1 and they, generally, have confined the Bordenkircher
restriction to the plea bargaining context.7 1 The Pearce-Blackledge
rationale has been used to protect criminal defendants when they
assert such fundamental rights as the sixth amendment right to
prosecutorial threat may have a deterrent effect upon a defendant's assertion of fundamen-
tal rights, this chilling effect nevertheless "is 'an inevitable'-and permissable---'attribute of
any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas."' Id. at 364
(quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
69. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); See also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
70. It has been estimated that at least 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convic-
tions are based upon guilty pleas; between 70% and 85% of all felony convictions are esti-
mated to be by guilty pleas. D. NEWmAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WrrHouT TRmM 3 (1966). The Supreme Court relied on Newman's statistics in
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
71. See, e.g., Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor cannot in-
crease the charge when defendant motions for mistrial based upon jury misconduct); United
States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor cannot reindict defendant because
of a motion to dismiss an earlier charge under the Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Alva-
rado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor cannot increase the charge when
defendant inquires of magistrate about possibly challenging a search); United States v.
Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976) (prosecutor cannot substitute a 41-count indictment
for original four-count indictment when defendant asserts statutory right to appeal convic-
tion); United States v. D'AIo, 486 F. Supp. 954 (D. R.I. 1980) (prosecutor cannot bring har-
sher charge in indictment to penalize defendant for seeking a mistrial).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978); Watkins v.
Solem, 571 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978).
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effective assistance of counsel," the eighth amendment right to
reasonable bail,74 the sixth amendment right to a jury trial,"1 and
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6 The ra-
tionale also has been extended to the exercise of statutory rights"
as well as the informal assertion of rights.7 8 In applying the
Pearce-Blackledge rule, lower courts have focused on the motiva-
tions of the prosecutor rather than on the resulting interference
with the defendant's rights. Thus, the division among these courts
centers on the question of whether a defendant must show the ap-
pearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness, actual prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness, or some intermediary standard of prosecutorial culpa-
bility to establish a due process violation under the Pearce-
Blackledge mandate.
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness
1. Appearance of Vindictiveness
Many lower federal courts have found that prosecutorial con-
duct evincing the "mere appearance of vindictiveness" is sufficient
to establish a prima facie violation of due process under the
Pearce-Blackledge rule.7 9 An appearance of vindictiveness gener-
ally is established when a prosecutor reindicts a defendant and in-
creases the severity of the charge after the defendant has exercised
a statutory or constitutional right.80 For example, in United States
73. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
75. See, e.g., Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1979) (right to trial de
novo with jury); Koski v. Samaha, 491 F. Supp. 432 (D. N.H. 1980) (right to trial de novo
with jury).
76. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 123 Ariz. 575, 601 P.2d 338 (1979).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1980)
(statutory right to plead nolo contendere); United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.
1978) (statutory right to dismiss action under the Speedy Trial Act); United States v.
DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977) (statutory right to
motion for change of venue); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976) (statu-
tory right to appeal conviction for alleged violation of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure);
United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (statutory right to be tried
before a district judge on misdemeanor).
78. See United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977) (defense
counsel approached magistrate because he wished to investigate the possibility of challeng-
ing a search).
79. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
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v. Demarco" the Ninth Circuit found an appearance of vindictive-
ness when the prosecutor responded to defendant's motion to
change venue by bringing additional charges based upon "substan-
tially the same facts as the first indictment."' 2 Similarly, in United
States v. Ruesga-Martinez" the Ninth Circuit applied the appear-
ance of vindictiveness standard to prohibit a prosecutor from re-
indicting defendant on a felony charge after defendant asserted his
statutory right to a trial before a district judge on the original mis-
demeanor charge. The court noted that the Pearce-Blackledge rule
applied whether the accused asserted a constitutional right, a stat-
utory right, or a common-law right.8
The District of Columbia Circuit also employs an appearance
of vindictiveness standard to review prosecutorial actions that re-
sult in increased charges against the defendant.85 In United States
v. Jamison"6 the circuit court held that the prosecutor violated due
process by reindicting defendant on a first degree murder charge
after defendant, who was on trial for second degree murder, suc-
cessfully motioned for a mistrial.87 The Jamison court stated that
Pearce granted a defendant due process protection against even
the "apprehension ... of receiving a vindictively-imposed penalty
for the assertion of rights."'"
Recently, in United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.8" a Dis-
trict of Columbia district court, relying on Jamison, also used the
appearance of vindictiveness standard to prohibit a prosecutor
from reindicting defendants on a harsher charge.90 The Velsicol
court dismissed the second indictment, holding that the prosecutor
violated defendants' due process rights by filing a felony indict-
ment, in addition to the original misdemeanor charge, solely be-
cause defendants chose to exercise their statutory right to plead
81. 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
82. Id. at 1226.
83. 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 1370.
85. See United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Vel-
sicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1980).
86. 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. Id. at 410. Defendant's motion for a mistrial alleged a denial of his sixth amend-
ment right to effective counsel.
88. Id. at 415.
89. 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1980).
90. Id. at 1265. Although the Velsicol court relied on the Jamison appearance of vin-
dictiveness standard, it went on to find actual vindictiveness, characterizing the prosecutor's
conduct as "an explicit threat, the gravamen of which is an intent to retaliate for the exer-
cise of a right." Id. at 1266.
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nolo contendere.' 1 The district court stressed that a strong causal
nexus existed between the prosecutor's opposition to the nolo con-
tendere plea and the subsequent felony indictment.2
On occasion, courts have expanded the appearance of vindic-
tiveness test to find due process violations in circumstances that
Pearce and Blackledge never contemplated. For example, in
United States v. Alvarado-Sandovalgs the prosecutor sought a su-
perseding indictment subsequent to a statement by defendant's
counsel to the magistrate that "he wished to investigate the possi-
bility of raising a question" of a search's legality.9 4 The court held
that the prosecutor's actions violated defendant's substantive due
process rights under the Pearce-Blackledge rationale.9 5 The court
reasoned that the increased prosecutorial charge created the ap-
pearance of vindictiveness, notwithstanding the fact that defen-
dant only tentatively asserted any of his rights.9 6
2. Realistic Likelihood of Vindictiveness
Recently, in United States v. Andrews 97 the Sixth Circuit
adopted a new test to determine whether prosecutorial actions
have denied a defendant due process under the Pearce-Blackledge
mandate. 8 In Andrews the court utilized an objective due process
standard: "whether a reasonable person would think there existed
a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness." 9 The Andrews court enun-
ciated three reasons for its adoption of the realistic likelihood stan-
dard. First, the standard frees defendants from apprehension con-
91. The record in Velsicol demonstrated that all criminal acts were completed by
1976, the original misdemeanor counts were filed in November 1977, the defendants pleaded
nolo contendere in May 1978, and the harsher felony indictment was fied in April 1979. Id.
at 1260.
92. The district court made an explicit finding that the prosecutor had made a pur-
poseful threat to defendant that he would bring additional indictments should defendant
choose to plead nolo contendere. Id. at 1266.
93. 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977).
94. Id. at 645.
95. Id.
96. The court stated that "[t]he failure to interpose a formal motion before the magis-
trate" did not distinguish the case from Blackledge and United States v. Ruesga-Martinez,
534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976). 557 F.2d at 645. The Alvarado-Sandoval decision illustrates
the problem of abuse inherent in a due process standard that focuses on the appearance of
some ill-defined prosecutorial motive rather than on the nature of the particular right as-
serted by the accused. See notes 136-49 infra and accompanying text.
97. 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
98. Id. at 454.
99. Id. The court noted that its realistic likelihood standard was not dependent on
"defendant's subjective impressions." Id.
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cerning vindictiveness by a judge or prosecutor in retaliation for an
assertion of his statutory or constitutional rights.100 Second, the
standard is "the only realistic way to police vindictiveness" be-
cause of the difficulty in proving actual retaliatory motivation. 101
Finally, the standard allows the judge to avoid the "Hobson's
choice," which the actual vindictiveness test presents, of either al-
lowing the extra charge or making an explicit finding of
prosecutorial bad faith. 02
The Andrews court next purported to distinguish its realistic
likelihood standard from the more lenient appearance of vindic-
tiveness standard. According to the court, the realistic likelihood
standard requires a "substantial" possibility of prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness whereas the appearance of vindictiveness standard re-
quires a "mere" possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness.10 3 Al-
though the court recognized a distinction in the two standards, it
did not confront the practical problems associated with application
of the realistic likelihood standard. Instead, the court remanded
the case to the district court.10 Thus, the parameters of the Sixth
Circuit's new realistic likelihood of vindictiveness due process stan-
dard remain undefined.
100. Id. (quoting from Pearce and Blackledge).
101. Id. The court reasoned that this goal of policing vindictiveness comported with
the prophylactic purpose of the Pearce rule. Id. at 454 n.7.
102. Id. at 455. The court cautioned that, in effect, an actual vindictiveness standard
would necessitate "calling a prosecutor a liar." Thus, the court fashioned its realistic likeli-
hood test to avoid confrontations between the judiciary and the executive branch. Id.
103. Id. The court noted that the mere appearance of vindictiveness is insufficient to
trigger Pearce-Blackledge sanctions. By contrast, the court presented its realistic likelihood
of vindictiveness standard, which, according to the court, required at least a substantial
possibility or a probability of prosecutorial vindictiveness to establish a due process viola-
tion. Id. The dissent, however, opined that the majority's distinction of the two standards
was elusive at best. Id. at 465 (Engel, J., dissenting). Contra, United States v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (D.D.C. 1980) (equating the appearance of vindictive-
ness test with the realistic likelihood of vindictiveness test).
104. In Andrews defendants originally were charged with possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1976). 633 F.2d 449, 451 n.2 (6th Cir. 1980). The
prosecutor requested that defendants be denied bail, and the magistrate agreed. The record
is unclear on the prosecutor's reason for opposing bail; apparently a third defendant had
turned state's evidence and had been threatened. Defendants successfully appealed this rul-
ing and were released on bail. Two days later, the prosecutor obtained a superseding indict-
ment that added a conspiracy charge. Id. It would seem that the prosecutor's opposition to
bail, coupled with the superseding indictment obtained two days after defendants' success-




The Fifth Circuit adheres to an actual vindictiveness standard
in determining whether a prosecutor's actions violate a defendant's
due process rights.105 For example, in Hardwick v. Doolittle ° the
Fifth Circuit held that a defendant must prove actual prosecutorial
vindictiveness to establish a due process violation when a prosecu-
tor adds additional charges for "different" and "distinct" criminal
conduct occurring within the same "spree of activity" covered by
the original indictment.'0 7 The Hardwick court stressed that the
judiciary should not interfere with the prosecutor's free exercise of
discretionary power to control crime, absent motives that are in
fact vindictive.10 8
In Jackson v. Walker °9 the Fifth Circuit clarified its position
by articulating a complex balancing test to be applied when a de-
fendant alleges prosecutorial vindictiveness. The court stated that,
In deciding whether to require a showing of actual vindictiveness or merely a
showing of reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness, a court must weigh the
extent to which allowing the second indictment will chill the exercise of the
defendants' appeal rights against the extent to which forbidding the second
indictment will infringe on the exercise of the prosecutor's independent
discretion.110
In applying this balancing test, however, the Jackson court held
that the prosecutor need only present a nonvindictive reason to
explain his conduct in order to tip the scales in his favor.' Thus,
as applied, the Jackson balancing test is tantamount to an actual
prosecutorial vindictiveness standard in all cases except those in
which the prosecutor substitutes more serious criminal charges for
the original charge based upon the same criminal act. Within this
narrow exception, the defendant need only show a "realistic likeli-
hood of vindictiveness.
11 2
105. See cases cited in note 16 supra.
106. 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
107. Id. at 302. Defendant originally was indicted for bank robbery and for the aggra-
vated assault of three policemen during the course of the robbery. After defendant exercised
his statutory right to remove the case to federal court, a successor prosecutor brought a
second indictment that added two other crimes that allegedly occurred during the same
bank robbery-assaulting a probation officer, who was used as a shield during the gun bat-
tie, and robbing a bank customer. Id.
108. Id.
109. 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 145.
111. Id. at 148.
112. Id. In weighing the competing interests, it seems that the Fifth Circuit gives
greater weight to the value of independent prosecutorial discretion than it gives to the de-
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More recently, in United States v. Thomas,11 s the Fifth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed its position that a defendant must show actual
prosecutorial vindictiveness to establish a due process violation. In
Thomas the court upheld the prosecutor's decision to bring more
severe criminal charges against defendants after defendants had
successfully moved to dismiss a multi-count indictment for vague-
ness.114 In the course of its decision, the Thomas court noted that
even the use of a balancing test as proposed in Jackson may not be
appropriate.11 5 Thus, Thomas indicates that the Fifth Circuit will
continue to employ an actual vindictiveness standard in determin-
ing the presence or absence of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
B. The State's Justification
Typically, when a state interferes with nonfundamental rights,
it need only show some rational basis for the action in order to
pass muster under substantive due process standards. If, however,
the state interferes with fundamental rights, it must prove that it
used the least restrictive means to effectuate a compelling state in-
terest.11  In addressing charges of prosecutorial vindictivenegs,
lower federal courts have ignored the fundamental or nonfunda-
mental nature of the asserted right when assessing the adequacy of
the state's justification. Yet, these same courts purport to follow
the Supreme Court precedents of Pearce and Blackledge, which
held that a state, absent a compelling interest, violates a defen-
dant's due process rights when it imposes a harsher criminal pen-
alty in response to a defendant's assertion of a fundamental right.
Thus, it appears that in the prosecutorial vindictiveness context
lower federal courts have taken an artificial approach by focusing
on the burden of proof to resolve the due process question. Specifi-
fendant's due process rights. Id. at 145-48.
113. 617 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 438.
115. The Thomas court suggested that Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978),
may have undermined the Jackson balancing test and signalled a general retreat from
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Id. at 438 n.1. There seem to be no other cases
suggesting that Bordenkircher undermines Blackledge outside of the plea bargaining
context.
116. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (fundamental right of privacy); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to travel). See generally Note,
The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justifica-
tion, and Some Criteria, 27 Vmiw. L. Rlv. 971 (1974).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976)
("Pearce and Blackledge apply regardless of whether the accused asserts a constitutional
right, a common law right, or a statutory right .... ").
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cally, these decisions indicate that, once the defendant has made a
prima facie showing of a due process violation, the state need only
prove a nonvindictive reason for the prosecutor's actions to rebut
the defendant's case.
In jurisdictions employing the appearance of vindictiveness
standard, the prosecutor must justify increased criminal charges
with reasons sufficient to dispel the appearance of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. 18 For example, in United States v. Jamison"" the
court stated that "a charge increase might in some circumstances
be justified by intervening events or by new evidence of which the
government was excusably unaware at the time of the first indict-
ment." 20 In United States v. Ricard121 the court upheld the prose-
cutor's decision to increase charges after defendant asserted his
right to trial simply because a second prosecutor had taken over
the file, reviewed it, and concluded that the facts warranted in-
creased charges. 22 In United States v. Partyka25 the court held
that the government had rebutted the appearance of vindictiveness
when the prosecutor, who orginally had refrained from bringing a
felony indictment to protect the identity of the government's in-
formant, brought a harsher charge after the informant's identity
had been revealed at the first trial and defendant had obtained a
reversal of the first conviction.'
2
4
In the Sixth Circuit, a prosecutor must justify increased crimi-
nal charges with evidence that dispels the realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness. 25 To rebut a prima facie case under this standard,
the government must show an "objective explanation" of the pros-
ecutor's actions. 26 In United States v. Andrews 2" the court stated
that there were two adequate explanations for increased charges:
prior legal impossibility and governmental discovery of previously
118. See, e.g., United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
120. Id. at 417. The Jamison court illustrated this point by the hypothetical posed in
Blackledge-if an assault victim later dies, the prosecution could properly increase the
charge from assault to homicide. Id. at 416.
121. 563 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
122. Id. at 48.
123. 561 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1977).
124. Id. at 124. The court grounded its holding in the policy of preserving the prosecu-
tor's discretion to decide "which of multiple possible charges against a defendant are to be
prosecuted or whether they are all to be prosecuted at the same time." Id.
125. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980).
126. Id.
127. 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
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unknown evidence. 128  The Andrews court cautioned that a
prosecutorial "mistake" in charging would be insufficient to rebut
the realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, but that prosecutorial in-
experience might be a sufficient justification.12
Under the Fifth Circuit's actual vindictiveness standard, a
prosecutor need only show a nonvindictive motive to justify in-
creased criminal charges in response to a defendant's assertion of
rights.130 Thus, in Hardwick v. Doolittle5 1 the Fifth Circuit stated
that a prosecutor could negate a showing of vindictiveness by
presenting evidence that defendant had withdrawn a guilty plea,
that the public had demanded prosecution of the additional
crimes, that the successor prosecutor had a different attitude to-
ward prosecutorial duty than the original prosecutor, or even that
the initial action was due to mistake or oversight.1 32 The Hardwick
court further stated that a prosecutor could carry his burden of
proof by showing that the charges were added for reasons "other
than to punish a pesky defendant for exercising his legal rights."133
Presumably, a prosecutor in the Fifth Circuit could justify his ac-
tions by testifying that he had acted in good faith.134 Thus, it. is
not surprising that the Fifth Circuit has rarely sustained a defen-
dant's challenge to increased charges based upon prosecutorial
vindictiveness.
1 3 5
128. Id. at 456. The Andrews court further noted that other "objective" explanations
would include prosecutorial inexperience and the unavailability of a grand jury. Id.
129. Id. In determining the validity of the prosecutor's actions, the Andrews court
ignored the nature of the right (i.e. constitutional, statutory or common-law) exercised by
defendant.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1980) (nonvindic-
tive motives satisfying due process include situations in which a witness changes his testi-
mony and those in which the prosecutor has a proper concern for a "second bowstring"
should the-original indictment be dismissed); United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802, 805 n.1
(5th Cir. 1979) (both defendant's own admission that there was no actual vindictiveness and
the prosecutor's discovery of new evidence rebut the claim of actual vindictiveness).
131. 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
132. Id. at 301.
133. Id.
134. The Hardwick opinion supports the conclusion that a prosecutor's testimony con-
cerning his good faith motives would suffice to rebut actual vindictiveness. See id. at 302.
The Hardwick version of the Pearce due process test focuses on the prosecutor's motiva-
tions and "actions rather than the defendant's reactions." Id.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Jones, 587 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); Hard-
wick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269 (5th
Cir. 1979). In Miracle the court held that defendant's due process rights were violated under
the Pearce-Blackledge standard when the prosecutor increased the charges after defendant
appealed his conviction based upon jury misconduct. Id. at 1276.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
A. Criticisms of Lower Court Tests
Because vindictiveness is a conclusionary term rather than an
analytical tool, the concept remains vague and subject to easy ma-
nipulation.138 Thus, the term should be discarded from substantive
due process analysis. The implementation problems inherent in
each test strengthen this conclusion and emphasize the need for a
new legal approach.
In the Fifth Circuit, the actual vindictiveness standard seems
to connote prosecutorial bad faith or subjective retaliatory motiva-
tion.13 7 This test, however, provides insufficient due process protec-
tion to criminal defendants"ss because proof of actual vindictive
motivation is difficult to establish. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit
rarely sustains due process challenges based upon prosecutorial
penalties.1 39 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's actual vindictiveness
standard runs contrary to the Supreme Court's express mandate in
Pearce and Blackledge that "actual retaliatory motivation" need
not be present to find a due process violation. 14 0
The appearance of vindictiveness standard also contains in-
herent defects because of its reliance on the term "vindictiveness."
This standard allows a defendant to establish due process viola-
tions too easily, especially in the pretrial context. Theoretically, an
appearance of vindictiveness arises every time a defendant asserts
a right and a prosecutor subsequently takes a position contrary to
the defendant's interests. As the dissent observed in Andrews, the
fact that a prosecutor "appears" to be vindictive every time he
136. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977) (due
process violation found based upon the appearance of vindictiveness, notwithstanding de-
fendant's failure to assert formally any rights).
137. In Pearce the Court equated "vindictiveness" with a subjective "retaliatory moti-
vation" on the part of the sentencing judge. 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969). The dictionary defines
vindictive as "intended for or involving revenge" or "characterized by an intent to cause
unpleasantness, damage, or pain." WansTE's THiD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTioNARY 2553
(unabridged ed. 1961).
138. See, e.g., Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding increased
charge by prosecutor in response to defendant's assertion of fundamental right to effective
counsel); United States v. Nell, 570 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding increased charge
by prosecutor in response to defendant's assertion of fundamental right to an impartial
jury).
139. See cases cited in note 135 supra.
140. In Blackledge the Court stated that "[t]he rationale of our judgment in the
Pearce case, however, was not grounded upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motiva-
tion must inevitably exist." 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974); Accord, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
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takes an adverse stance on "an endless variety of procedural, evi-
dentiary, substantive, and tactical questions" renders the standard
unworkable.1 4 1 United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval1 42 highlights
the problems with this standard. In that case the court found a
due process violation based upon the appearance of vindictiveness,
even though the alleged abuses of prosecutorial power followed
only a tentative assertion by defendant of a possible constitutional
challenge to his arrest.
In some respects Pearce and Blackledge lend support to the
appearance of vindictiveness standard. Specifically, the Court in
Blackledge stated that due process entitles an individual to seek a
trial de novo without "apprehension that the State will retaliate by
substituting a more serious charge for the original one. ' 143 A more
complete interpretation of Pearce and Blackledge, however, treats
those decisions as falling within unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine-in both cases defendants exercised fundamental constitu-
tional rights and the state responded with harsher criminal sanc-
tions.14 4 Viewed as unconstitutional conditions cases, Pearce and
Blackledge stand for the proposition that substantive due process
prohibits a prosecutor from withdrawing or cancelling leniency to
penalize an individual's exercise of fundamental rights.
The realistic likelihood of vindictiveness standard, recently
adopted by the Sixth Circuit, 45 purportedly strikes a balance be-
tween the apparent vindictiveness and actual vindictiveness stan-
dards.1 46 Because the Sixth Circuit failed to apply its new test to
the facts of the case, however, this standard is still undefined and
may be as unworkable as the other due process standards. 47 In
addition, as one dissenter properly stated, the application of the
realistic likelihood standard renders it indistinguishable from the
appearance standard.
1 48
141. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 459 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., dissent-
ing). In his dissent Judge Merritt urged that the Pearce-Blackledge rationale be confined to
the postconviction setting, since these cases retain a "double jeopardy flavor," even though
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the applicability of the double jeopardy clause. Id. at'
458.
142. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
143. 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
144. See notes 44-63 supra and accompanying text.
145. Andrews v. United States, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
146. Id. at 454-55. See notes 97-104 supra and accompanying text.
147. The Andrews court remanded the case to the district court to apply the new test.
Id. at 457.
148. Id. at 467 (Engel, J., dissenting). Judge Engel's contention that the two tests are




By blind reliance on the elusive term "vindictiveness" when
dealing with challenges to prosecutorial actions, lower federal
courts have failed to address important issues inherent in the
American scheme of constitutional liberties. That scheme ranks in-
dividual liberties in terms of their relative value and accords more
constitutional due process protection to those rights deemed fun-
damental. 149 This Recent Development submits that any intelli-
gent standard in this context must focus more clearly on both the
nature of the right asserted by the defendant and the nature of the
reason for the prosecutor's action. Specifically, under this approach
courts must distinguish between a defendant's assertion of a fun-
damental right and his exercise of a nonfundamental or statutory
right.
1. The Exercise of Fundamental Rights
Courts should apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
when defendants allege prosecutorial vindictiveness. Thus, absent
a compelling interest, a prosecutor should not be permitted to con-
dition leniency on the defendant's waiver of a fundamental right or
to withdraw leniency as a penalty for defendant's assertion of a
fundamental right.150 Both precedent and policy favor application
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions. Pearce and Blackledge, the leading cases in this
area, support the use of the doctrine as a substantive due process
protection available to criminal defendants. 151
1255 (D.D.C. 1980), which was decided on the same day as Andrews. In Velsicol the court
held that the prosecutor violated defendants' due process rights under the Pearce-
Blackledge rule by creating an "appearance of vindictiveness," but the court used this
phrase synonomously with "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness." Id. at 1263-64.
149. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
150. A prosecutor's decision to increase the charges against a defendant for exercising
a fundamental right may be characterized most accurately as an instance in which a state
benefit-leniency-is conditioned upon the nonassertion of fundamental rights. See gener-
ally Van Astyne, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 2. Thus, in such situations, a court
should find an unconstitutional condition violative of due process unless the state can
demonstrate a compelling interest. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
151. Both Pearce and Blackledge may be interpreted as holding that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine prohibits the state from penalizing a defendant for exercising his
fundamental rights by withdrawing the benefit of leniency. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note
2, at 904-08. In Pearce the Court held that the prosecutor withdrew leniency to penalize
defendant for exercising his fundamental fifth amendment right to refrain from self-incrimi-
nation. 395 U.S. at 713. In Blackledge the Court held that the prosecutor brought harsher
charges to penalize defendant for exercising his fundamental sixth amendment right to a
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Additionally, as a matter of federal constitutional policy, the
state should be required to distribute the benefit of criminal leni-
ency in a constitutionally benign way.152 Otherwise, because of the
vital nature of this state benefit there is a tremendous potential for
the erosion of fundamental rights. 53 When a prosecutor conditions
leniency on a criminal defendant's nonassertion of fundamental
rights, he places that defendant under strong pressure to forego
those rights and to accept the benefit of a shorter period of
incarceration.M
The element of forced participation endemic to the criminal
justice system provides another sound reason for the application of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to prosecutorial actions.
Unlike other state schemes in which the individual, theoretically,
may preserve his full range of constitutional rights by choosing to
forego participation in the scheme, the criminal justice system
compels the individual to participate. As Justice Powell stated, the
state must enable criminal defendants to exercise their full range
of constitutional rights because of their limited choices.5
United States v. Andrews'56 presents a clear situation in
which the court should have found an unconstitutional condition.
In that case the prosecutor added conspiracy charges to the origi-
constitutionally adequate jury trial. 417 U.S. at 22-23. See notes 44-62 supra and accompa-
nying text.
152. See notes 21-43 supra and accompanying text. With the erosion of the right-priv-
ilege distinction, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine emerged to force the government
to distribute state benefits in a manner that did not penalize individuals for exercising their
constitutional rights. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires that the state choose
between constitutionally benign distribution of benefits or no distribution. See generally
Rubin, supra note 72; Van Alstyne, supra note 27.
153. Many of the Supreme Court decisions that have found unconstitutional condi-
tions have emphasized that the particular condition discourages the exercise of the funda-
mental right. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 609 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05
(1963). Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine sets up a prophylactic rule to stay the
erosion of fundamental rights. See generally French, supra note 2; Van Alystne, supra note
27; Comment, supra note 2. To find an unconstitutional condition, however, there need not
be actual deterrence of the exercise of the fundamental right. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972).
154. See, e.g., Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967), in which the court invali-
dated a Tennessee statute that provided that unsuccessful habeas corpus applicants would
not be eligible for probation consideration until a year beyond the usual time. Striking down
the statute for imposing an unconstitutional condition, the court observed that "[o]nly a
prisoner with an inclination to play Russian roulette with a year of his life would be likely to
file a petition for writ of habeas corpus under this regulation." Id. at 790.
155. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1977).
156. 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
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nal indictment just two days after defendants exercised their
eighth amendment right to reasonable bail.157 Although the Sixth
Circuit focused its analysis on whether there existed a realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness, 15 8 it should have employed an uncon-
stitutional conditions analysis. The strong causal nexus between
the harsher reindictment and defendants' assertion of their eighth
amendment rights, as evidenced by the prosecutor's original oppo-
sition to bail and the timing of the reindictment, indicates that the
prosecutor's actions effectively penalized defendants. 159 Although
the state in Andrews had a legitimate interest in prosecuting de-
fendants for the highest offense that their conduct warranted, the
prosecutor served that state interest by bringing the initial
charge. 60 Thereafter, the state had no compelling interest in rein-
dicting the defendants on harsher charges based upon essentially
the same conduct as the original indictments. 161 Thus, the prosecu-
tor's action in penalizing defendants' exercise of a fundamental
right clearly constituted an unconstitutional condition.
As the analysis in Andrews indicates, lower courts also have
failed to differentiate between a defendant's assertion of funda-
mental rights and the assertion of nonfundamental rights when de-
termining the sufficiency of the state's justifications for the actions
of its prosecutor. 62 These courts have accepted as legitimate many
proffered state justifications for increased criminal charges; few of
these justifications, however, should satisfy the compelling interest
test when the exercise of a fundamental right is involved.
The state has a compelling interest in charging an individual
for the highest crime that his conduct warrants under prevailing
157. Id. at 451.
158. Id. at 453.
159. Id. at 451.
160. It must be presumed that the prosecutor effectuates the state's interest in pun-
ishing a particular defendant for a particular crime by exercising his discretion in the initial
charge based upon a knowledgable assessment of the facts. See Note, Criminal Proce-
dure-Protection of Defendants Against Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 54 N.C. L. REv. 108,
115 (1975); note 161 infra.
161. The National District Attorneys Association has stated that the prosecutor has a
special responsibility to make an appropriate and accurate charge at the outset and must
take into account both the offender and the offense. The Association has further stated that
"[o]ver-charging, for coercive purposes or lack of judgment is an affront to the essence of
justice." NATIONAL DISTRICT ATrORNzYs ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
130 (1977).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Pearce and Blackledge apply regardless of whether the accused asserts a constitutional
right, a common-law right, or a statutory right).
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penal theory,6 3 and that interest may justify increased charges
under certain circumstances. For example, a prosecutor clearly has
a compelling interest in reindicting a defendant for criminal acts
committed subsequent to the first indictment.16 ' Similarly, the
compelling interest test is met when the prosecutor shows previous
legal impossibility-for example, when an assault victim later
dies.16 5 In this situation, the state's compelling interest in charging
the defendant for the highest crime his conduct warrants permits
the prosecutor to bring a superseding homicide indictment.
Increased criminal charges based upon the government's dis-
covery of previously unknown evidence may withstand strict scru-
tiny due process review under certain circumstances. Under these
circumstances, a close causal nexus between the increased charges
and the defendant's assertion of fundamental rights may mitigate
against finding a compelling state interest. 166 For example, if a
prosecutor does not reindict until after the defendant has had his
conviction overturned based upon constitutional error, then the
state's interest may no longer be compelling.
Courts should deem noncompelling the following justifications
when fundamental rights are penalized: mistake or oversight in the
initial action,167 reassessment of the facts by succeeding prosecu-
tors, 1 68 protection of government informers,169 and prosecutorial in-
experience.17 0 As a matter of policy, courts also should presume
that the prosecutor serves the state's interest in prosecution by the
original exercise of discretion in bringing the charge.171 The uncon-
163. The state has a strong interest in protecting the safety and welfare of its citizens
from the unrestrained liberty of some individuals. See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERN-
zENT 88 (1948).
164. Pearce recognized the state interest in a harsher criminal sanction, specifically a
harsher resentencing upon retrial, based upon "identifiable conduct on the part of the de-
fendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." 395 U.S. at 726.
165. The Blackledge Court gave this example, which allowed a prosecutor to bring a
homocide charge if an assault victim died, despite any deterrent effect on defendant's rights.
417 U.S. at 29 n.7.
166. For example, in United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C.
1980), the court stressed that the causal nexus between defendant's assertion of rights and
increased prosecutorial charges is probative concerning whether due process is violated. Id.
at 1261-66.
167. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1977); Hardwick v.
Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118, 123 (8th Cir. 1977).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d at 456 (6th Cir. 1980).
171. Some courts have permitted prosecutors to reindict when the new charges do not
address the precise criminal act addressed in the original indictment. See, e.g., Jackson v.
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stitutional conditions doctrine should prohibit the prosecutor from
reserving the power to charge for more crimes based upon the
same criminal activity when he later invokes that power to penal-
ize or to deter the defendant's exercise of fundamental rights.
2. The Exercise of Statutory or Other Nonfundamental Rights
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine should not apply
when the state penalizes an individual for exercising statutory or
other nonfundamental rights.17 2Generally, when a prosecutor pe-
nalizes a criminal defendant for asserting a statutory or other
nonfundamental right, the prosecutor must show that the state ac-
tion bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate government pur-
pose. 1 7 Under this rational basis standard, courts traditionally up-
hold the state action.1 4 Thus, in practical effect, substantive due
process places few constraints on the state's ability to impose con-
ditions or penalties following a defendant's exercise of statutory or
other nonfundamental rights.
Some statutory or nonfundamental rights may nevertheless
deserve a due process review more significant than the rational ba-
sis test. In these situations, courts should apply an intermediate
level of review. For example, although the right of appeal has never
been considered fundamental,175 the Supreme Court has stressed
Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
172. Substantive due process requires that individuals be afforded more due process
protection for the exercise of fundamental rights than for the exercise of statutory and other
nonfundamental rights. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1976). This author found no
cases applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect rights other than those
deemed fundamental. For examples of recent applications of the doctrine to fundamental
rights, see cases cited in note 3 supra.
173. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-41 n.23, 560-62 (1979) (holding that various
prison regulations that infringe the nonfundamental liberty interests of inmates are ration-
ally related to the government's interest in maintaining prison security).
174. Id. at 1886. For a case upholding a similar standard in the economic substantive
due process area, see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
175. The Supreme Court has long recognized that there is no fundamental constitu-
tional right of appeal. In McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894), the Court first
held that the federal constitution does not require that a state provide appellate courts or a
right of appellate review. In recent decisions, the Court has consistently reaffirmed this
principle. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976); Estelle v. Dorrough,
420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975) (per curiam); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per
curiam); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
Currently, state constitutions or statutes control the right of appeal. See McKane v. Dur-
ston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894); Gardella v. Field, 291 F. Supp. 107, 111 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the importance of the right of appeal.
Thus, in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), the Court held that "the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in
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that once state-created avenues of appellate review are established,
"it is . . .fundamental that . . these avenues must be kept free
of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal
access to the courts."176 Therefore, an intermediate level of due
process scrutiny such as that used by the Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut" may be an appropriate way to recognize the impor-
tant, but not fundamental, right of appellate review.
When reviewing prosecutorial actions that penalize a defen-
dant's exercise of nonfundamental rights, courts should confront
separately the question whether a prosecutor has carried out the
ethical duties that are concomitant with his extensive authority.17 8
Although the rational basis test will almost always protect the
prosecutor from due process challenges, courts should still invoke
their supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice
to control overreaching that constitutes an abuse of discretion.179
An effective judicial sanction would be dismissal of the additional
charge. 10
The Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) provides gen-
eral support for the sanctioning of a prosecutor in appropriate cir-
cumstances."' Ethical Consideration 7-13 of the Code states that
"[tihe responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the
usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to con-
vict.'1 8 2 Also, Disciplinary Rule 7-103 prohibits a prosecutor from
instituting criminal charges "when he knows or it is obvious that
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." In addition, in Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the state must provide indigents
with appointed counsel on their first appeal granted by state law as a matter of right. See
also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (when states require a trial transcript for appeals,
the state must provide the cost of the transcript to indigents seeking review). For the asser-
tion that a right of appeal may eventually be recognized as a federal constitutional right, see
Eades, Appellate and Post Conviction Relief in Tennessee, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 3
(1974).
176. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
177. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. See generally ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 71-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
179. See note 20 supra and accompanying text; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 340-41 (1943). See also ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 178, at 79-81.
180. The ABA recommends that, at the appellate level, the sanction of reversal be
employed as "the ultimate penalty against prosecutors, but, short of this, appellate courts
can also enunciate standards for both prosecutors and defense counsel." Id. at 81.
181. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
182. Id., EC 7-13.
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the charges are not supported by probable cause. '183 Unfortu-
nately, however, the Code's standards provide inadequate rules for
governing prosecutorial misconduct.1 8 4 Commentators have criti-
cized the probable cause limitation because it allows prosecutors
too much leeway. 85 A proposed alternative to the Code186 offers
some promise with its proposed ethical obligation on prosecutors
to refrain from seeking an indictment unless "a fair-minded juror
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty. '187 Regrettably, the conduct of prosecutors involved in the
administration of criminal justice in this country is neither super-
vised nor disciplined adequately.58 Thus, courts must exercise
their supervisory powers to control prosecutorial misconduct even
when due process affords a defendant no protection.
V. CONCLUSION
The judicial response to the problems posed by the conduct of
a prosecutor who brings increased charges against a criminal de-
fendant for exercising his legal rights has not been adequate.
Lower federal courts have adopted divergent standards, focusing
on whether there exists an appearance of prosecutorial vindictive-
ness, a realistic likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness, or actual
prosecutorial vindictiveness. By couching their analyses in terms of
the prosecutor's motivations, these courts have ignored the over-
riding principle of substantive due process, which holds that fun-
damental constitutional rights should be afforded greater due pro-
183. Id., DR 7-103. See also ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 178, at 91 (§
3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision. (A) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows that the charges are not
supported by probable cause).
184. See Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance
from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145 (1973). Uviller criticizes the probable cause require-
ment, stating that "[tihe standard of probable cause does not require exacting judgment
from the prosecutor, for it does not entail great certainty concerning the underlying truth of
the matter; 'probable cause' may be predicated on hearsay, and, indeed, does not even im-
port a substantial likelihood of guilt." Id. at 1156. Uviller asserts that the ethical imperative
is to keep prosecutorial discretion free from improper motivation, but he finds the ABA
standards vague in this regard. Id. at 1151-52.
185. See id.
186. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF
CONDUCT (Public Discussion Draft, M. Freedman, Reporter) (June 1980).
187. Id. at § 9.3 (Responsibilities of Government Lawyers).
188. See ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 178, at 55-69, 79-81. See also
Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. 1
(1980); comment, Prosecutorial Misconduct: A National Survey, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 422
(1971).
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cess protection than nonfundamental rights. This Recent
Development submits that courts must recognize that the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine applies to cases alleging
prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, when a prosecutor brings in-
creased charges against a defendant for asserting a fundamental
right, such action violates due process unless the state can demon-
strate a compelling interest. On the other hand, when a prosecutor
brings increased charges against a defendant for asserting a
nonfundamental right, the action does not violate due process if
the state can demonstrate a rational basis for the action. Even if
there is no due process violation, however, it is incumbent upon
the courts to invoke their supervisory powers to control
prosecutorial abuses when nonfundamental rights are implicated.
Increased judicial supervision of prosecutorial misconduct will ben-
efit both individual defendants and the criminal justice system.
JOHN J. CROSS, III
